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CONVERSION OF DIGITAL PROPERTY:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE AGE
OF TECHNOLOGY
Caitlin J. Akins'
Introduction
A high school student recently sued and successfullyne otiated a settlement with Amazon.com after the online
retailer deleted his homework.2  In July 2009, Amazon
unilaterally removed ebook publications of George Orwell's
Animal Farm and 1984 from all of their customers' Kindles4
without notice and without consent.' Users could no longer
1 J. D. Candidate, Boston College Law School, May 2011; A.B. Princeton
University, 2006. Many thanks to Fred Yen for his generous comments.
2 Geoffrey Fowler, Amazon Pays for Eating Student's Homework, WALL
ST. J. DIGITS BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/10/01/amazon-pays-for-eating-students-
homework/?mod=rssWSJBlog.
Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ebooks are digital books that users can read using an
electronic device, and are "created by converting digitized text into a format
readable by computer software").
' The Kindle is an eReader; an electronic device on which customers may
read ebooks. See Amazon.com: Kindle Wireless Reading Device,
http://www.amazon.com/dp/BO02Y27P3M/ref=kindlesu-2 [hereinafter
Amazon Kindle Homepage]. The Kindle is manufactured and distributed by
Amazon.com. Id. Since Amazon first introduced the Kindle eReader, multiple
new versions of the device have been released, including the "Kindle 2" and
"Kindle DX," which this Note will refer to generically as the "Kindle." See id.
Although other companies have released eReaders for digital books, and some
like the Sony Reader have been quite successful, Amazon's Kindle has
emerged in the field as the standout market leader. See Nicholson Baker, A
New Page; Can the Kindle Really Improve on the Book?, THE NEW YORKER,
Aug. 3, 2009, at 24; Alexandra Zendrian, A Kindle, Gentler Nation,
FORBES.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/22/kindle-
ereader-amazon-intelligent-investing-microsoft.html.
' Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics From Kindle. (One Is '1984.'),
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B 1. Apparently this was not the first time that
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access texts they had purchased and any personal notes customers
had added to their ebooks were rendered useless.6 The personal
notes that the plaintiff took on his version of 1984 for a school
project were effectually deleted along with his ebook file.'
The ironic Orwellian overtones of Amazon's behavior
were highly publicized, and uniformly decried in the media and
blogosphere. One victim noted, "it's like Barnes & Noble
sneaking into our homes in the middle of the night, taking some
books that we've been reading off our nightstands, and leaving us
a check on the coffee table."'
Kindle owners everywhere with these titles in their digital
libraries experienced the same thing, illustrating how modern
digital product 0 providers retain substantial power over their
products even after a sale to a customer is completed." While
Amazon deleted books from users' devices; according to the article Amazon
reportedly removed Ayn Rand novels and Harry Potter books on prior
occasions. See id.
6 Complaint at 4, Gawronski v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 09-CV-01084-JCC
(W.D. Wash. July 30, 2009) (settled before trial).
See id.
8 Geoffrey Fowler, Kindle's Orwellian Moment, WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG
(Jul. 17, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/07/17/an-orwellian-moment-
for-amazons-kindle/tab/article/; David Pogue, Some E-Books Are More Equal
Than Others, N.Y. TIMES POGUES'S POSTS (July 17, 2009),
http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/some-e-books-are-more-equal-than-
others/; see also Stone, supra note 5.
Pogue, supra note 8 (quoting anonymous source).
10 This Note will use the term "digital" to reference any intangible property
that might otherwise be referred to as "virtual," "electronic," "digital,"
"intangible," or "cyber"; the term references goods or assets that exist in a form
only perceptible to humans with the aid of a machine, that show rivalrousness,
and that are commonly sold over the Internet, including ebooks, ringtones,
movies, music, television shows, fonts and clipart, computer programs, etc.
See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50
(2005).
" See Pogue, supra note 8. The category of digital product could be
extended as far as the items created, sold, and traded on virtual life websites.
Andrea Vanina Arias, Note, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords and
Armor: Regulating Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 1303 (2008).
Because these products have already been addressed by a host of scholarship,
this Note will not address such goods. See generally, Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164 (Dec. 2004) (discussing legal
claims related to injunctions against unwanted computer system use); Michael
A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1485, (2007) (arguing against broad classification of cyberproperty); Fairfield,
supra note 10 (addressing legal issues related to emerging forms of property);
Charles Blazer, Note, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. REV.
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surprise deletions had occurred before, this was the first time a
user sued.12 The plaintiff reached a settlement granting monetary
damages and enjoining future deletions from Kindles." Despite
the lawsuit's success, Amazon's technological capability to
interfere with digital customer products after they are purchased
has not changed. 14  At the heart of it, Amazon electronically
137 (2007) (discussing approach for defining virtual property); and Molly
Stephens, Note, Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the Continuing
Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect Digital-Content Creators, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1513 (2002) (addressing the failures of the current system to
protect intellectual property). Instead, this Note will focus on products like
ebooks and music downloads that are digital analogues to ubiquitous products
in the non-digital world. See Baker, supra note 4.
12 Complaint, supra note 6; Stone, supra note 5.
13 Fowler, supra note 2. See also Stipulation of Settlement at 5, Gawronski
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 09-CV-01084-JCC (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2009),
available at
http://assets.bizjournals.com/cmsmedia/pdf/KindleCasel.pdf?site=techflash.c
om [hereinafter Settlement]. While not explicitly laid out, the language of the
agreement indicates that Amazon is enjoined from deleting items from any
Kindles, not just those of the Plaintiffs, since the initial lawsuit was brought on
behalf of three certified classes, one of which was all Kindle users. Id.
14 See Nilay Patel, Amazon Clarifies Kindle Book-Deletion Policy, Can
Still Delete Books, ENGADGET (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.engadget.com/2009/10/01/amazon-clarifies-kindle-book-deletion-
policy-can-still-delete-b/. In the wake of the deletions, for example, Amazon
CEO Jeff Bezos claimed that in looking ahead, "[w]e will use the scar tissue
from this painful mistake to help make better decisions going forward, ones
that match our mission." Eric Engleman, Bezos Apologizes for Removal of
Classic Orwell Titles from Kindle, TECHFLASH (July 23, 2009),
http://www.techflash.com/seattle/2009/07/Bezos-apologizes-for-removal-of-cl
assicOrwelltitlesfromKindle_51519642.html. Amazon also apologized
profusely, calling the deletions "stupid, thoughtless, and painfully out of line
with our principles." Id. Although Amazon's intentions may have changed,
their capacity to delete remains the same. See Patel, supra. Amazon has
subsequently explained that a third party, who did not possess rights to the
books 1984 or Animal Farm, uploaded them to the Kindle Store via Amazon's
self-service upload tool. See Stone, supra note 5. The company attempted to
excuse its behavior by explaining that the ebooks removed had been sold in the
Kindle Store in violation of copyright law, and that Amazon was simply trying
to provide a remedy for the oversight. See Fowler, supra note 8.
Understandably, the apologies and excuses have not fully allayed users' anger
or uncertainty about future actions, because the technological sophistication
that enabled Amazon to delete the ebooks remains functional. See Ina Fried,
Amazon Says It Won't Repeat Kindle Book Recall, CNET NEWS (July 17,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13860_3-10290047-56.html?tag=mncol;1n;
Farhad Manjoo, Why 2024 Will be Like Nineteen Eighty-Four, SLATE (July
20, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2223214; Patel, supra. One can certainly
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"stole" Kindle users' books and notes with impunity."
The Orwell deletions also call attention to the changing
nature of consumer transactions, as high quality Internet-based
services and digital products with sophisticated technological
platforms become available.16 Several factors create a distinct
power imbalance between the modern Internet customer and the
digital product provider." First, and most importantly, there is a
technological imbalance that allows providers to invade users'
privacy and reach into their homes in unprecedented ways.18
Second, there is an information imbalance: customers'
expectations regarding the true nature and legal status of their
purchases are frequently inaccurate." Third, there is a
bargaining imbalance where even the informed customer has
little say over any of the terms and conditions they agree to
during online transactions.2 0 Often, these end-user license
agreements ("EULAs") resemble contracts of adhesion with terms
that strongly favor the provider. 2
imagine scenarios in which corporations might suddenly find incentives to
delete ebook files that outweigh the deterrent factor of their settlements. See
Manjoo supra; Patel supra.
IS See. Patel, supra note 14; Pogue, supra note 8.
16 See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How
TO STOP IT 4 (Yale University Press 2008); David Barnhizer, Propertization,
Contract, Competition, and Communication: Law's Struggle to Adapt to the
Transformative Powers of the Internet, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
" See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
" See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 113; Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1065-67;
Manjoo, supra note 14.
1 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 177; Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online
Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated
Information Flows, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND ENT. L.J. 741, 763
(2008). Many customers, for example, believe that when they are buying an
ebook, they are purchasing legal title, rather than just a license. See Manjoo,
supra note 14.
20 See Daniel D. Barnbizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining
Power and Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69,
71-72 (2006). A contract of adhesion is essentially one of procedural
unconscionability. See Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr.
2d 376, 381-82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing arbitration clause in
reverse mortgage); Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 908 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (La.
2005) (defining contracts of adhesion as "standard contract[si, usually in
printed form, prepared by a party of superior bargaining power for adherence
or rejection of the weaker party.").
1 See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104-106 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that shrinkwrap terms as elements of bargained-for
transactions are not enforceable); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link,
[Vol. 23:2,218
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This Note will explore the threat of the growing power of
Internet-based product and service providers over digital
property, and how tort actions, specifically conversion, can help
restore the balance of power.22 Part I discusses the growing
consolidation of Internet-based provider power, and how
providers exert control over their products after the sale through
technological controls and EULAs, as illustrated by the Kindle
case.23  Part II describes the practical details of the Orwell
deletion litigation, revealing the best methods for protecting
customers' digital property going forward.2 4 Part III presents the
history of conversion and an analysis of modern conversion
actions, detailing recent court inclusions or exclusions of digital
property in conversion charges, and demonstrates how
technology changes in digital property can be legitimate forces for
legal change.2 5 Finally, Part IV argues that tort litigation in the
form of conversion is the best way to curb provider control over
post-sale digital property.
I. Background
A. Kindle Mechanics
In addition to the Kindle, Amazon sells digital books,
magazines, and other texts, which are downloaded through a
wireless radio network.2 6 Users may modify and annotate their
Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding initial shrinkwraps
enforceable, but not altered shrinkwraps arriving in subsequent shipments);
SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1088 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (holding plaintiff not bound by shrinkwrap terms because of lack of
consent to terms of the agreement).
22 See infra notes 26-259 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 26-82 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 83-106 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 107-168 and accompanying text.
16 See Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4. Although some electronic
devices can be little more than fads, the Kindle, iPad, and other eReaders have
signaled a paradigm shift and bona fide migration towards ebooks. See Dylan
F. Tweney, Large-Screen Kindle Won't Mean Squat if Apple Tablet Arrives,
WIRED.COM GADGETLAB (May 4, 2009),
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/05/kindle-vs-apple/. Their low price-
per-ebook and emerging adoption by universities both evidence this trend. See
Steven Bell, When Every Student Has a Kindle, LIBRARYJOURNAL.COM
FROM THE BELL TOWER (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA6687288.html; Amazon Kindle
Homepage, supra note 4.
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downloaded publications by entering written notes with a full
keyboard, dog-earing pages, placing bookmarks, and saving
segments as "clippings." 27  All of these modifications are saved
both on the user's device itself and on Amazon's servers during
routinely conducted uploads.2 8
Despite efforts to make the Kindle resemble a traditional
book, there are important differences between this digital format
and print publications.2 9 Contrary to the popular conception that
users buy a digital book when they purchase a publication for the
Kindle, users only receive a license to view the purchased title on
their Kindle device." The device communicates with the
Amazon servers, where the source copies of each publication are
stored, and the device temporarily saves each publication on
users' Kindles." Thus, Amazon retains and controls the full copy
of the purchased content, which is stored alongside user notes on
the company's server.32
B. The Consolidating Control of Internet Product Providers
Internet-based service and product providers frequently
enlarge their power vis-h-vis consumers, and exploit the resultant
power imbalance they hold over customers." Operating their
websites, products, and transactions in an essentially unrestricted
27 Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4.
28 Kindle License Agreement, Amazon.com (Feb. 9, 2009) available at
http://g-ecx.images-
amazon.com/images/G/O1/digital/fionalgeneral/KindleUser-Guide.pdf.
29 See Baker, supra note 4.
* See Kindle License Agreement, supra note 28; Manjoo, supra note 14.
11 Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4.
32 See id. Amazon posits this setup is a benefit, allowing a customer who
loses his Kindle to have full content restored upon receipt of a new device. Id.
The ability to provide this consumer benefit comes at the expense of retaining
control over the publications and user modifications long after the initial sale.
Id. The only way to prevent this communication is to disable the wireless
radio function by flipping off the device's radio switch. Id. But because this
solution only lasts as long as the radio connection is disabled, a user who
chooses this option can never purchase new books, which are delivered via the
radio function. Id. Essentially, a customer's only weapon to fight automatic
updates cripples the device permanently. Id.
" See Kevin Emerson Collins, Cybertrespass and Trespass to Documents,
54 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (2006). See generally Chang v. Virgin Mobile,
USA, 2009 WL 111570 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (discussing defendant's for-profit use
of Plaintiff's image, found on website Flickr and used without Plaintiff's
consent).
[Vol. 2 3:2220
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manner, digital product providers are aptly positioned by their
sophisticated technological infrastructure to gain the upper hand
over consumers who enter into contractual relationships with
them.3 4 Future harms of this imbalance could include
entrenchment of the acceptability of Internet-based providers
interfering with products after they are sold.35  Acceptance of
such interference could eviscerate the privacy of one's home,
diminish one's autonomy in controlling purchased goods, or
interfere with commerce by weakening consumer trust and
willingness to engage in online transactions."
1. Technological Controls Used on Customers
Licensed electronic books differ from printed books in
part because the historical use and sale of intellectual property
over the Internet has encouraged aggressive protectionist
behavior from copyright protected digital product providers."
Providers of digital music attempted to prevent widespread
illegal downloads on file sharing websites by bringing major
lawsuits. As centralized music sharing services were taken
down, however, unauthorized music trading activity migrated to
Peer-to-Peer ("P2P") file sharing, which was harder to track,
rendering litigation more difficult.39
Product providers, therefore, turned to powerful digital
rights management ("DRM") technologies to help control the use
of their products. 40  DRM helps limit unauthorized uses of
copyrighted materials by adding sophisticated security programs
to digital products, making it difficult for users to create copies or
" See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of
Electronic Commerce, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1500-01 (2004).
3s See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 4, 113; Manjoo, supra note 14.
16 See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 75-77; Ari Schwartz et al., Storing Our
Lives Online: Expanded Email Storage Raises Complex Policy Issues, 1 I/S: J.
OF L. & POL'Y. FOR THE INFO. Soc'Y., 597, 598-99 (2005).
" Matthew Amedo, Shifting the Burden: The Unconstitutionality of
Section 512(H) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Its Impact on
Internet Service Providers, 11 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 311, 312 (2003);
Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749, 774 (2008); Fairfield, supra note 10, at
1065-66.
3 See Amedo, supra note 37, at 311-13. The ease of copying these
products and the rise of file sharing websites led to numerous lawsuits. Id.
* See id.
40 Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and
Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 324 (2004).
2010] 221
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use the product on competitors' devices.4 But protecting against
copyright infringement by strengthening DRM exponentially
increases providers' power over digital products post-sale.4 2
Further, bolstering DRM technology has created an escalating
"arms race" between product providers and consumers or
hackers.4 3 Every DRM advance causes hackers to respond with
their own technological solution, which in turn prompts providers
to create even stronger,. more sophisticated controls." Thus,
DRM technologies have significantly amplified the power of
digital content providers without delivering absolute protection
against copyright infringement.45
The prominent control of Internet-based providers has
become a part of users' lives in other ways.46 As electronic
devices rise in popularity, and users increasingly access the
Internet through those devices, the ability to regulate what users
can do through the Internet vests more and more in the producers
of those devices.47 Email service providers also retain access to
consumer information after customers engage in an initial service
agreement.4 8 These providers have access to customers' email
accounts, which are becoming repositories of personal and
sensitive information as entities like Google increase storage
limits and encourage users not to delete anything.4 9 .Not only does
this raise privacy issues, but these providers are contractually
empowered to delete users' information under certain
41 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 105-07; Bechtold, supra note 40, at 325.
42 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process
of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60 (2006).
" See id. at 61.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 60-6 1; Bechtold, supra note 40, at 331.
46 See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 70-71. The information gathered about
consumers includes, "the Internet searches a consumer performed, web sites
visited, items viewed, purchases made, as well as any personal data
surrendered by the consumer in the course of his or her shopping. .. .In the
information era, consumer activities are transparent and known by those who
can pay for that knowledge, and in most cases consumers have no control over
how others use their personal information." See id. at 7 7-78.
47 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 8-9, 105-07.
48 See Schwartz, et al., supra note 36, at 598-99. Another example of such
service provider control and court tolerance is illustrated by the Flickr EULA
and concomitant litigation in Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA. See 2009 WL
111570, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding defendant Virgin Mobile not liable for
using Plaintiff's photo, without Plaintiff's knowledge, as part of advertising
campaign, in part because Flickr's EULA allowed such use).
49 See Schwartz et al., supra note 36, at 600-01.
222 [Vol. 23:2
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conditions.so
2. The Use of End-User License Agreements
Many Internet-based providers use EULAs, which are
contracts specifying the services and functionalities customers
may expect from the provider.s" EULAs are often required at the
point of sale, creating contract-based restraints on customers'
activity.5 2 Apple, Inc., for example, has admitted that it regularly
conducts sweeps of all iPhones, checking to see if any unapproved
applications ("apps") exist.s3  Further, Apple's EULA for the
iPhone gives Apple the right to eliminate any apps at any time.54
This use of a EULA comes remarkably close to permitting Apple
to undertake activity similar to Amazon's Orwell deletion.5 The
Apple EULA demonstrates how providers control their post-sale
products by creating contracts to reserve power and lay out
specific, limited consumer uses.56
Amazon, like virtually every modern Internet provider,
uses EULAs. Unlike the EULAs used for most online
transactions, though, the Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and
" See id. In his Complaint, the plaintiff noted that the "power to delete
your books, movies, and music remotely is a power no one should have. . . ."
See Complaint, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting Manjoo, supra note 14). This
sentiment could arguably extend beyond the digital product realm and across
all Internet transactions and standing relationships, including email. See
Manjoo, supra note 14.
s1 See Richard Warner, Turned on its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and
Acceptable Terms in Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 1,
3-4 (2008).
12 Id. at 22-24.
" Manjoo, supra note 14. The iPhone is one of Apple's premier devices,
which combines the functionality of a cellular phone, digital music player, and
internet browser. See Apple iPhone Homepage,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/ (last visited Apr 14, 2010). Apps are
application programs, developed by users or Apple, that are designed to
enhance some element of the device's functionality. See id. Popular apps
display maps and routes for users, provide games, or perform calculator
functions. See id.
14 Fred von Lohman, All Your Apps Are Belong to Apple: The iPhone
Developer Program License Agreement, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Mar. 9, 2010) http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/iphone-
developer-program-license-agreement-all; Manjoo, supra note 14.
s See von Lohman, supra note 54; Manjoo, supra note 14.
56 See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 70-71; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing
Cybeispace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 687-
90 (1998); see also supra note 21 and accompanying materials.
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Terms of Use takes the form of a classic shrinkwrap agreement
("shrinkwrap")."7  A shrinkwrap is -delivered enclosed in a
physical product's packaging, either visible through the
packaging's plastic wrapper, or buried inside, with labeling or
stickers on the outer packaging notifying consumers of the license
within. The customer's act of opening the wrapping signifies
his assent to the terms of the shrinkwrap license, even though the
agreement and its terms are inside the wrapping.59 The only way
to express lack of assent to the agreement is to return the
product.6 0  However, retailers often reject returns despite
language to the contrary included in the shrinkwrap."
Nonetheless, courts have upheld shrinkwraps over the last
two decades. In 1996, the Seventh Circuit decided the tide-
changing case on shrinkwrap approval, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, in which a court held a shrinkwrap enforceable for
the first time.62  Although the case history following ProCD's
approval of shrinkwraps has been mixed, the majority of courts
have come to recognize and uphold shrinkwraps. ProCD's
" See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
'shrinkwrap license' gets its name from the fact that retail software packages
are covered in plastic or cellophane 'shrinkwrap,' and some vendors ... have
written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the
wrapping from the package."); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 459, 467 (2006); Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use,
amazon.com (Feb. 9, 2009)
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=200144530.
Technically, the Kindle EULA arrives in digital form, loaded onto the user's
Kindle, but in the sense that it may only be read after opening the device
packaging, it should be approached as a shrinkwrap. See Kindle License
Agreement, supra note 28.
" Dan Streeter, Comment, Into Contract's Undiscovered Country: A
Defense of Browse-Wrap Licenses, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2002).
59 Id.
60 Lemley, supra note 57, at 467-68.
61 Id.
62 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). ProCD was the first case
to recognize the validity of a shrinkwrap, and it set the stage for enforcement
of agreements that could only be read after a customer had paid for and
opened the packaging of the product containing the agreement. Id.
63 Lemley, supra note 57, at 468-69. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding mail-order computer
purchase's shrinkwrap constituted the effective contract for the transaction,
and therefore was enforceable); Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 150 F.
Supp. 2d 585, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding online EULA not binding due
to greater similarity to browsewrap agreement than otherwise acceptable
shrinkwrap, which is unenforceable because of lack of consumer consent). But
224 [Vol. 23:2
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acceptance of binding consumers at an early stage in the
transaction process also paved the way for later judicial
acceptance of clickwrap64 and browsewrap65 agreements, which
are alternative forms of EULAs that occur in the context of
online transactions and web-browsing, respectively. 6
As a category, these EULAs are one-sided contracts and
are often not bargained-for, whether they come physically as
paper inserts in packaging or appear digitally during an online
transaction.6 7 These agreements have empowered online
providers by entrenching their practice of setting EULA terms,
which are often very favorable to the online provider. One
commentator argues that court recognition and enforcement of
shrinkwraps has "undermined classical notions of assent" because
consumer rights and power are curtailed by the requirement to
accept any and all terms produced by the product provider.9
see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d. 1332, 1337-39 (D. Kan. 2000)
(recognizing split of authority regarding shrinkwrap licenses, and concluding
that ProCD was not sufficiently persuasive).
64 Clickwraps are standardized contracts displayed on a flash screen
during an online transaction or download, requiring the user to click on a box
(sometimes with accompanying text "I accept" to signify their assent to the
terms). Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 593-94.
6s Browsewraps, similar to clickwraps, are agreements internet users enter
into while using the Internet. Id. at 594. They are more specific than
clickwraps in that assent is implied by a user's simple act of accessing a
provider's website. Id. at 594-95. A link at the bottom of a webpage will
usually say "Terms and Conditions" or "Terms of Use," and upon clicking the
link, an Internet user will be able to view all of the terms they have "agreed" to
by logging on to a website and continuing to use it. Id. Browsewraps and
clickwraps pose complicated issues that go well beyond the scope of this Note.
See Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese:
Law and Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 95-
96 (2008) (discussing generally modern developments in online contracting).
66 Lemley, supra note 57, at 469.
67 Warner, supra note 51, at 3-4.
6 See Lemley, supra note 57, at 459-61. However, the court also reasoned
in ProCD that customers were not totally deprived of reasonable opportunity
to assent, given that their assent was not demanded at any one time, but rather
took place on their own time table. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
6 Lemley, supra note 57, at 467. See also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright
Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93,
93-94 (1997) (considering copyright owner and user relationships in the wake
of ProCD); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999) (discussing the
merits of regulating intellectual property licensing); Raymond T. Nimmer,
Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 827, 828-30 (1998) (exploring contract law as it
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C. The Kindle's Own EULA
In addition to Amazon's implementation of Kindle DRM,
its collection of consumer information, and its ability to remove
information from Kindles, Amazon also uses EULAs as a control
device. 70 As soon as customers use their new Kindles, they agree
to all provisions of the EULA, as well as any contained in the
content provided on Amazon.com, the Kindle Store, or in
Amazon.com's privacy notice.n In this way, when they 'agree' to
the EULA, Kindle users theoretically agree to not only read
materials initially, but to continue monitoring the Amazon
website for updates or changes to their terms of service.72
The Amazon EULA suggests in obscure provisions that
buying an ebook only gives users a license to access and read a
text file, not to own a distinct, though digital, piece of property."
Possessing a mere license74 restricts the product uses to those
outlined by the provider or rights holder, whereas an outright
product owner's uses are unfettered." So, unlike the title holder
of a regular book, a Kindle user may not lend his files to a friend,
tear out pages for other uses, or do any of the other acts
relates to intellectual property law); Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still a
Prerequisite for Contract Formation in Today's E-conomy?, 78 WASH. L. REV.
265, 290-93 (2003) (arguing browsewraps should be deemed unenforceable due
to lack of assent).
7 See Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, supra note 57.
See also Jeremy Kirk, Hackers Claim Victory in Cracking Amazon Kindle
DRM, PC WORLD, (Dec. 23, 2009) http://www.pcworld.com/article/185408/
(reporting that Kindle DRM successfully hacked).
" Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, supra note 57.
71 See id.
1 RAYMOND NIMMER & JEFF DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 1:2
(2009); Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, supra note 57.
" Nimmer and Dodd offer a definition for a license:
A license is an agreement that deals with, and grants or
restricts, a licensee's contractual right, power privilege or
immunity with respect to uses (including allowing access to)
information or rights in information made available by a
licensor. The agreement includes a focus on what rights,
immunities, or uses are given or withheld in reference to use
of the information as well as what the licensee has agreed to
do or not to do with respect to the information.
NIMMER & DODD, supra note 73.
" Id. Whether a purchaser has title to digital property otherwise protected
by copyright generally depends on the amount of restriction placed on the
licensee. Id.
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associated with full property ownership.7' Thus, in legal and
practical terms, a license to view gives users fewer rights than a
full title of ownership.
Though the license granted is quite restrictive, it does not
contain an express provision authorizing Amazon to remotely
delete Kindle documents, or give notice that such an action is
possible." One might argue that Amazon has harmed its
customers by failing to either explicitly notify them about this
potential harm or add an express permission for the action.
Further, Amazon's EULA "grants [users] the non-exclusive right
to keep a permanent copy of the applicable Digital Content and
to view, use, and display such Digital content an unlimited
number of times. . ."80 Interfering with a right granted
permanently for unlimited viewings is a breach of that right.81
Amazon's termination of Kindle users' rights to access their
ebooks appears to violate Amazon's own EULA.82
II. One User's Attempt to Right the Power Imbalance
Plaintiff Justin Gawronski, along with Antoine Bruguier,
filed a class action lawsuit in the Western District Court of
Washington against Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Digital
Services, Inc. on behalf of all customers impacted by the Orwell
deletions.83 The complaint alleged that "remotely deleting digital
content" from customers' Kindles was wrongful. 84 The plaintiffs
alleged harm against three classes: general Kindle owners, whose
confidence in their devices was shaken; the class of users whose
digital books were removed; and finally the users whose personal
notes recorded on the deleted books were rendered useless. On
behalf of these classes, the plaintiffs brought a violation of terms
of use agreement claim, a conversion claim, and a breach of
contract claim that cited the Kindle Terms of Use Policy." The
76 See id.; Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, supra
note 57.
"7 See NIMMER & DODD, supra note 73.
78 See Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, supra note 57.
7 See id.
8o Id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
3 Complaint, supra note 6, at 1.
84 Id. at 2.
85 Id. at 8.
86 Id. at 10-16. Plaintiffs also brought a federal computer fraud claim, a
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plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Amazon acted
wrongly and without justification, and prayed for damages,
litigation expenses, and injunctive or declaratory relief from the
same type of behavior in the future."
In early September 2009, while the litigation was pending,
Amazon offered its customers either $30 or a new version of the
deleted books." While this offer might have satisfied some
consumers, it came almost two months after the deletions, and
much of the injury suffered by customers was irreparable.8 9
On September 25, 2009, just weeks after Amazon's
reimbursement offer, the parties settled the lawsuit out of court.90
The settlement awarded $150,000 to the plaintiff's attorney, with
a stipulation that part of it go to charity, and enjoined Amazon
from remotely deleting or modifying Kindle users' ebooks or
notes unless requirements such as obtaining a judicial order or
consumer consent are met." Thus, a formal legal agreement now
exists, requiring Amazon to uphold its promise not to
haphazardly make any deletions from users' Kindles.92
Although the suit has been settled, and Amazon
theoretically has less incentive to pursue a future deletion, since
doing so will mean disobeying a court order, many of the issues
the Orwell deletions laid bare remain." In the future, Amazon
simply could contract for consumer assent to deletions by using
shrinkwrap EULAs, or deviate from promised service when
ordered by a court or other higher authority to do so.94 Despite
trespass to chattels claim, and a state law consumer protection claim. Id.
8' Id. at 17-18.
" Fowler, supra note 2.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Settlement, supra note 13, at 5. Although awards typically go to the
plaintiffs themselves, in this case, for reasons that are not evident from the
settlement agreement, the award went to the plaintiff's counsel, at least in part
as a payment of fees. See Simon Usborne, No Sense of Belonging,
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 6, 2010) available at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/features/who-owns-your-ebook-1858785.html (quoting
Harvard Law Professor Jonathan Zittrain).
92 See Settlement, supra note 13, at 4.
* See id.
9 See Lemley, supra note 57, at 459-61. One commentator argues that
"the law needs to catch up with the technology to prevent a scenario in which
'a court-ordered change at Google could affect every participating library and
consumer's version of the book'. .. Devices like the Kindle ... ought to be
designed so that people can back up a copy of a work that places it beyond the
reach of the vendor, and anyone who might order the vendor around." Id.
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the publicity of the Orwell deletions, consumers may remain
unaware of the nature of the item they are "buying.""s In
addition, the fact that the users affected were offered full refunds
may not truly repair customers' sense of betrayal by a trusted
business provider. 9 6 Finally, Amazon is only one of hundreds of
major online retailers large and powerful enough to wield this
type of control over customers in their homes, so this settlement
hardly marks an end to such conduct. 97
Applicable litigation-based solutions addressing the
growing power imbalance between consumers and providers are
limited.98 Although current contract remedies might seemingly
provide a solution, EULAs are standard in most transactions and
have been routinely upheld by courts. Eliminating their use
would completely disrupt the form of modern online
transactions.9 9 Eliminating the types of one-sided provisions
providers often include in EULAs would require exceptional, and
therefore inefficient, court oversight of private business
transactions. 00 Beyond these practical and theoretical problems,
encouraging contract remedies would not elicit any moral
condemnation or disincentives the way punitive damages would
for providers' egregious actions. 0 '
* See Manjoo, supra note 14.
96 See Settlement, supra note 13, at 5.
97 See Manjoo, supra note 14.
98 See Barnhizer, supra note 16, at 1-2. Criminal law and crimes akin to
theft or burglary are beyond the scope of this Note. See Arias, supra note 11,
at 1308. Privacy violations are also beyond the scope of this Note (considering
privacy issues in the context of the non-physical world). See generally Patricia
SAnchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 3 (2007); Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case
of On-line Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 126 (2005)
(discussing the meaning of "territorial privacy" in cyberspace); Brain Kane &
Brett T. Delange, A Tale of Two Internets: Web 2.0 Slices, Dices, and is
Privacy Resistant, 45 IDAHo L. REV. 317, 318 (2009) (analyzing various ways
Internet transactions infringe on user privacy); Dierdre K. Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1557 (2004) (questioning the adequacy of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act to protect consumer privacy).
99 See Tasker & Packyk, supra note 65, at 148-49.
100 See Streeter, supra note 58, at 1387.
o See White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Wis. 1967) (rejecting
punitive damages despite malicious breach intended to harass contract
partner); see also Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read
Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in
Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1483 (2008). "Contract law does not
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Tort actions, on the other hand, do include elements of
moral condemnation. 10 2  Although only acts undertaken with
intent or malice generally meet the standard required for a court
to impose punitive damages, the idea of implicit wrongdoing is
inherent in all tort actions. 0 Within tort law, conversion is the
best forum for addressing Internet-based provider deletions or
control issues.10 4
The remainder of this Note will examine the applicability
of tort, specifically conversion, to digital products.0 Then, it
examines and defends the rationale for judicial adoption of digital
products into this cause of action to respond to highly empowered
Internet-based digital property providers. 0 6
III. Conversion & Digital Property: A Foundation
A. A Short History of Conversion
One solution for counterbalancing the immense power of
digital product and service providers is the common law tort of
conversion.'0 7 Conversion is the unauthorized or wrongful use of
even involve the kind of moral condemnation associated with tort law, much
less with criminal law. Contract law has strict liability and is unconcerned
with assigning moral judgment to breach, either by allowing defenses or by
awarding punitive damages." Id.
102 See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Conversion of Electronic Data,
Including Domain Names, 40 A.L.R. 6th 295, § 2 (2008).
103 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). With specific
reference to conversion, "punitive damages may be allowed in a conversion
action when the conversion involves elements of fraud, ill will, malice,
recklessness, wantonness, oppression, insult, willful or conscious disregard of
the plaintiff's rights, or other aggravating circumstances." 18 AM. JUR. 2D
Conversion § 125 (2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Crowd Mgmt. Servs. v.
Finley, 784 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (awarding punitive damages
on theory of deterrence when defendant showed willful disregard for plaintiff's
rights and converted plaintiff's money); Murray v. J & B Int'l Trucks, 508
A.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Vt. 1986) (awarding punitive damages when reckless
disregard for plaintiff's rights led truck financing company to repossess
plaintiff's truck).
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 223 (1979).
105 See infra, notes 107-158 and accompanying text.
10 See infra, notes 159-259 and accompanying text.
10I Courtney W. Franks, Comment, Analyzing the Urge to Merge:
Conversion of Intangible Property and the Merger Doctrine in the Wake of
Kremen v. Cohen, 42 HOuS. L. REV. 489, 492 (2005). Reigning in the power of
internet product providers by curtailing their DRM capabilities and expanding
consumer choices often strategically focuses on the right of consumers to freely
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another's property.10  Traditionally the tort was limited to
chattels, which are tangible personal property."o' The historical
anchoring of conversion in chattels is important because it means
that conversion traditionally would not apply to intangible
property.10
Conversion evolved out of trover, an action to compensate
plaintiffs for lost chattels found by another person who refused to
return them."' Over the centuries the tort "became encrusted ...
with legal rules that assumed that the property taken was
tangible."' 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to
conversion as dispossessing another of a chattel through
"intentional exercise of dominion or control" and "seriously
interferes with the right of another to control it.""'
A chattel-taker's intentional conduct, rather than his good
or bad faith, is the key aspect to conversion liability.114
Dispossession of one's property is committed intentionally when
one takes "a chattel from the possession of another without the
other's consent" or bars "the possessor's access to a chattel,"
among other methods."' Thus, a small element of scienter is
inherent in conversion, because liability requires understanding
that the property belongs to another. 6
The traditional conception of conversion began fading in
use products after purchasing them from online providers. See Armstrong,
supra note 42, at 60-61. However, the issues examined in this Note take
almost the opposite approach, and examine products that have already been
sold, which are subsequently interfered with or taken back by the original
seller. See id. In this sense, this Note departs from one of the most traditional
legal approaches, copyright protections and intellectual property regulation.
See Dougherty & Lastowka, supra note 37, at 774.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 223 (1965); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 227 (1965).
109 See Buckman, supra note 102, at § 2.
1o See id.
" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 89 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., West 5th ed. 1984); Val D. Ricks,
Comment, The Conversion of Intangible Property: Bursting the Ancient Trover
Bottle with New Wine, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1681, 1683 (1991).
112 Ricks, supra note 111, at 1685.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 223(a) (1965); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
114 See 18 AM. JUR. 2d Conversion § 3 (2010).
"1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 221 (1965).
116 Id. § 222 cmt. b. Courts will end their inquiry, though, upon
establishing intentionality and ignore any elements of good or bad faith the
tortfeasor may possess. See id.
2010] 231
Loyola Consumer Law Review
the last century when wealth started shifting toward intangible
assets such as securities."' Courts began to. recognize conversion
of intangible assets or other property embodied in physical
documents, like .stock certificates, leading to a doctrine called
"merger.""' Under this doctrine, when intangible rights are
merged, or represented, in a document that is then converted, the
original owner may receive the value of the embodied intangible
right in a successful conversion action."'
Some courts have begun to waive the formal requirement
that an asset or chattel be manifested in a physical document in
certain circumstances,120 while other courts cling to the physical
document element.12 1  More liberal treatments of the merger
117 See Buckman, supra note 102, at § 2.
118 See H. D. Warren, Annotation, Nature of Property or Rights Other
Than Tangible Chattels Which May Be Subject of Conversion, 44 A.L.R. 2d
927 (1955); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965):
(1) Where there is conversion of a document in which intangible rights are
merged, the damages include the value of such rights.
(2) One who effectively prevents the exercise of intangible rights of the kind
customarily merged in a document is subject to a liability similar to that for
conversion, even though the document is not itself converted.
Id.
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965). Though a stretch
from the original conception of tangible chattel, the doctrine of merger makes
sense because when a tortfeasor interferes with or takes a document that
embodies intangible rights, he also takes those intangible rights away from the
original possessor. See id. Those intangible rights are what make the
document valuable; without them, any given document may not be worth
more than the value paper and ink on it. See id. Courts have upheld
conversion suits for all types of intangibles merged with.physical documents
over the years. See Pickford Corp. v. De Luxe Labs., Inc., 169 F. Supp. 118,
120 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (literary property inherent in motion picture film); Simon
v. Reilly, 151 N.E. 884, 885 (Ill. 1926) (bonds); lavazzo v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Co.,
155 A. 407, 408 (R.I. 1931) (savings bank books). Incorporating merger into
the modern notion of conversion empowers many to recover the value of
intangible goods taken from them. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
242 (1965).
120 See Franks, supra note 107, at 517. Although New York and California
have waived the requirement, other states have taken a relaxed approach to
the doctrine of merger: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania. See id. at 517, & n. 197.
121 See Arias, supra note 11, at 1311-12. States that have refused to depart
from the requirement of physical merged documents include Nevada,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. See id.; Franks, supra note 107, at 522, & n.
233. In between the two extremes of this type of treatment and more liberal
treatment from jurisdictions doing away with merger requirements for
intangible property are a number of other middle-of-the-road approaches
[Vol. 23:2232
Conversion of Digital Property
doctrine will allow any type of media to effect a merger, while
more restrictive approaches require an actual document as the
embodiment of the intangible right, effectively barring many
types of digital property from recovery. 122
B. Applying the Historical Law of Conversion to Technology of
the Digital Era
By slightly expanding the doctrine of conversion, it could
apply equally to digital property that is not embodied in a
physical document. 123 This tort could become critical in our era
of hacking, firewalls, and encryption, where many important
documents exist solely in digital format, reachable from any
location1 24  The average hacker might have little trouble
interfering with owners' personal documents. Their actions
would be takings or manipulations of the intangible documents
themselves, rather than the merged physical documents. 25
1. Kremen v. Cohen Sets an Agenda
Conversion .of digital property has been successfully pled
in some jurisdictions for decades. 126  Certain states, notably
California and New York, have repeatedly recognized conversion
of digital property.2 2 Kremen v. Cohen, decided in 2003 by the
Ninth Circuit, is a seminal decision in this trend.128 The plaintiff
sued Network Solutions, a domain name registry corporation, for
giving away plaintiff's properly registered Internet domain name
cobbled together by courts. See Franks, supra note 107, at 518-19.
122 See Arias, supra note 11, at 1311. Thus, digital property like ebooks,
which are not merged with any type of unique physical document, would not
be treated as fitting in the merger doctrine. See id.
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965).
124 See Buckman supra note 102, at § 2
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965); Buckman supra
note 102, at § 2.
126 See Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 838,
848 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding plaintiff had right to possession of cable signal
transmissions, and plaintiff sufficiently pled for conversion action); Nat'l. Sur.
Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So. 2d 847, 849 (Ala. 1982) (holding a computer
program may be the subject of conversion); Payne v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 339, 342-43
(1880) (holding stocks convertible).
127 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 2007).
12' Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036.
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to a third party.12 9  This third party fraudulently persuaded
defendant Network Solutions to transfer the registration and
began using the domain name for personal profit.3 0 Kremen sued
Network Solutions asserting conversion among other claims.13 '
The Ninth Circuit upheld plaintiff's conversion claim for his
Internet domain name.13 2
The court noted that California law had begun disposing
of the strict requirement that property be merged with a tangible
document over a century earlier. 33  In 1880, the California
Supreme Court resolved that the common law notion of
conversion had "developed into a remedy for the conversion of
every species of personal property."l 34  In Kremen, the Ninth
Circuit noted that California at various stages in time continually
rejected strict merger requirements.3 s
The Ninth Circuit continued by reasoning that regardless
of California's stance on merger, an electronic registry containing
plaintiff's domain name absolutely counted as a document, based
on the fact "[t]hat it is stored in electronic form rather than on ink
and paper is immaterial." 36  Describing the standard for
identifying property rights in any context, the court applied a
three-pronged analysis. '3  First, it recognized that the intangible
property must be sufficiently well defined to give others notice of
the property right.3 1 Second, exclusivity in the property right is
necessary for any relevant harm to accrue. 13  Otherwise the
possessor would not truly be deprived or harmed by the
conversion.140 Finally, that claim of exclusivity must be vested in
129 Id. at 1026-27.
130 Id.
1 Id. at 1027-28.
1 Id. at 1033-36.
133 Id. at 1031.
134 Payne, 54 Cal. at 341.
135 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1032.
"6 Id. at 1033-34. The court explained thaf "the existence of a paper
document rather than an electronic one" was irrelevant. Id. at 1034 (emphasis
in original). Otherwise "[t]orching a company's file room would then be
conversion while hacking into its mainframe and deleting its data would not."
Id. The court found it sufficient that the intangible asset bore some relation to
a database or depository of information that simply existed somewhere. See
id. at 1034, 1036.
" Id. at 1030 (citing G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Services,
958 F.2d 896,-902-03 (9th Cir. 1992)).
131 See id.
1' See id.
14 See id.
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the purported owner.141
2. New York Adopts the Trend
A few years after Kremen, in 2007, the New York Court of
Appeals similarly recognized virtual property in Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., accepting a certified question
as to whether the common law action of conversion could be
applied to electronic computer records and data. 14 2 The plaintiff
in that case was a long-time employee of the defendant insurance
company and used a loaned company computer to record client
information as one of her duties. 143 After firing the plaintiff, the
defendant company appropriated the computer, complete with all
of the information contained in its files, including her client lists,
and plaintiff brought suit to recover the information.144 The court
took a functional approach, determining that the computer and
electronic documentation are a way of life and should not be
"treated any differently from production by pen on paper. 1l45
In its discussion, the court listed four reasons why the
digital chattel at issue should be recognized for the purposes of
conversion. 146 First, there must be a civil remedy to accompany
the criminal charge of theft in some cases.147  Second, virtual
documents are only a button push away from being printed and
manifested as tangible chattels.148 Third, in a philosophical sense,
writing is writing, no matter what form it takes; and writing is a
form of property.14 9 Fourth, there must be a way to recoup the
expenses of creating digitized possessions.s 0 Elaborating on the
practical realities of virtual documents, the court also concluded
that itis not a document's or idea's physical manifestation that
determines its worth, but the value of its content.''
141 See id.
142 Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1273. The court answered the certified question
in the affirmative. Id.
"' See id.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 1275-78.
146 See id. at 1277.
147 See id.
148 See Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1277.
149 See id.
Iso See id.
151 See id. at 1278.
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3. Application to Digital Property is Not Universal
The wave of court acceptance of intangible property or
rejection of the strict merger doctrine has not been universal. 2
The District Court of Massachusetts, having recognized in 1986
in Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc. that intangibles
like cable signals were capable of being converted, recently
backpedaled from this position. In the 2007 decision, In re TJX
Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation, the court formally
overruled Quincy and insisted on adhering to the traditional
perspective on conversion, rejecting incorporation of digital
property claims into the tort.15 4  Banks and creditors of TJX
Companies sued when a breach in TJX's secure computer system
led to the theft of thousands of digital customer files, including
credit card numbers."' Stating outright that "a claim for
conversion based on the type of intangible property at issue here
likely is not cognizable in Massachusetts," the court declined to
follow the recent judicial trends in California and New York, as
well as the precedent of Quincy. "6
The court explicitly insisted that In re TJX could be
distinguished from Thyroff because, unlike the typed electronic
document in Thyroff, TJX's computer system was not able to
easily print out the converted information."' Therefore, it seems
the lack of physical-world analogues to TJX's information system
was at least partially determinative in the ruling."'
C. Technology as a Game-Changer
Technological progress can challenge legal assumptions
and precedent with the invention of a single machine or
innovation.'59  Discerning the consequential effects of
12 See Arias, supra note 11, at 1311-12.
15 See Quincy Cablesystems, 650 F. Supp. at 840.
154 In re TJX, 527 F. Supp. 2d 209, 2 12-13 (D. Mass. 2007), affd [in part]
564 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 2009).
155 See id. at 211.
156 See id. at 212-213.
157 See id. at 213. The court distinguished the case from Thyroff because
the information on the TJX computer could not be printed easily. See id.
"5 See id. at 212-13.
159 See Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 60-61
(2007). Of course the mere fact that new technologies challenge the existing
legal structure does not mean there is a de facto mandate to change the law.
See id. Rather, such challenges should compel reflection on the purposes of
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technological change on legal rules is not a problem unique to the
age of the computer.160
When the airplane was invented at the turn of the
twentieth century, the property ownership adage cuius est solum
eius est usque ad caelum et ad inferos was well ingrained into
legal and social thought.16 1 Yet by 1946, following a turbulent
few decades for aviation law, the United States Supreme Court
formally overruled the common law "usque ad caelum" adage,
pragmatically allowing airplanes to fly over private property
above a certain altitude to accommodate the flood of aviation and
its critical tie to American commercial and economic interests. 162
After decades of emerging aviation technology and ongoing
policy debates, one commentator writes, we eventually "changed
our property law because of the airplane." 63
Just as the airplane brought critical societal change, online
transactions are shaping many aspects of the modern consumer
experience, especially with respect to digital media and digital
property. 164 Indeed, intangible assets or properties are not new,
but their accessibility and widespread acceptance in the average
person's life has skyrocketed. 6 Now that iTunes is ubiquitous,
Amazon has hit seven figure sales tallies, and cloud computing
draws nearer, digital property will continue to grow in
importance. 16 6
our judicial system, which does on occasion change both positive law and
common law assumptions. See id. "Law and technology dance together in
complicated ways, and they have been doing this dance for a long time." Id. at
60.
160 See STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO
CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 16 (2008).
161 Id. at 16. Roughly translated, the owner of land owns infinitely up to
the heavens and down through the underworld.
162 See id. at 247-50, 253 (citing U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
163 See id. at 3. Another commentator notes about Causby that the
airplane rewrote the law of trespass, and "[w]hat was formerly understood as
trespassory is now, with the adoption of new technology, understood as non-
trespassory." See Lastowka, supra note 159, at 64.
164 See BANNER, supra note 160, at 247-50.
165 See Streeter, supra note 58, at 1386.
166 Mitch Ratcliffe, Updating Kindles Sold Estimate: 1.49 Million,
RATIONAL RANTS (Dec. 26, 2009), http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ratcliffe/?p=486.
Cloud computing is generally defined as the practice of accessing software,
programs, and other interfaces that are stored by an unknown third party,
whether on the third party's hardware or as part of the third party's software
system, and which enable users to access their information from any internet
connection. Heinan Landa, Silver Linings: Cloud Computing Changes the
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For the law to be effective in restraining the Internet-
based providers' unfettered control of digital property, it must
actively protect customers by establishing equilibrium of control
over digital property transactions.167  Enlarging the scope of
conversion actions to include deleted, hidden, or overtly-
controlled digital property would be a critical step forward for
courts across the nation.168
IV. The Case for Digital Property Conversion
A. The Inapplicability of Other Solutions
Although legislation is often imperative in furthering
consumer protections, formal regulation is seen by many as
anathema to the creative spirit and ever-developing nature of
Internet technology. 169  Legislating prematurely, before all the
potential harms of consolidating provider control are pinpointed,
could also result in laws that do not completely protect
consumers, restore the true balance of online transactions, or last
beyond the next generation of technology.170
Past efforts to restore balance to the system have also
failed.'' For example, courts have not been receptive to legal
challenges to EULAs based on contract principles.'72 Courts rule
this way ip spite of the way EULAs nearly eliminate consumer
consent, fail to fulfill true business needs of providers, and
resemble contracts of adhesion.'
Applying contract principles to the Kindle EULA, for
Landscape of IT Services, 28 no. 5 LEGAL MGMT. 70, 70 (2009); Diane Murley,
Law Libraries in the Cloud, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 249, 249-50 (2009). Cloud
computing could erode consumers' ownership of their digital property even
further by entrenching in society the idea that one's digital property is not even
stored on a personal device, but is kept in some unknown remote location on
the internet. See Landa, supra, at 70. It's not clear whether the control
wielded by digital property providers suggests enough negative consequences
that the law should adapt to meet the technology. See BANNER, supra note
160, at 247-50.
167 See Lastowka, supra note 159, at 64-65.
161 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 268; Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036.
169 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 105, 111.
1o See id., at 4; Donald Labriola, Dissonant Paradigms and Unintended
Consequences: Can (and Should) the Law Save Us from Technology?, 16 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2009).
'7' See supra notes 145-62 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 145-62 and accompanying text.
113 See Arias, supra note 11, at 1332; Lemley, supra note 57, at 467.
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example, is also more difficult in practice than in theory. On one
hand, users generally do not understand what the EULA actually
promises, and those users who do read it could be confused by its
contradictory terms and legal jargon, potentially signaling lack of
assent.174 On the other hand, permanent license or not, the
agreement clearly states that ebooks are subject to suspension of
service.1s
Thus, even absent unfavorable court precedent, contract
litigation does not clearly protect customers' rights. Ideally,
though, there should be a legal solution favorable to customers,
since most hold mistaken beliefs about what they have agreed to,
and in the case of Kindle customers, it is a stretch to argue they
ever truly assented to the deletion of their ebooks and notes.'76
Innovative responses to restrictive DRM have also
generally failed to keep pace or provide powerful enough
solutions to restore consumers to an equal plane with
producers. 77  Without the funding or sophistication to fully
trump providers' DRM, customer efforts to push back only
prompt providers to strengthen their DRM, making the
technology much more harmful and invasive than it was
originally designed to be.17
There is a significant and latent threat in innocuous
technologies unexpectedly taking on more detrimental features.
Another example is the two-way radio feature on the Kindle,
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2)(a) cmt. e (1981);
O'Rourke, supra note 56, at 692; see Kindle License Agreement, supra note 28.
One telling provision states, "Amazon grants [the user] the non-exclusive right
to keep a permanent copy of. the applicable Digital Content and to view, use,
and display such Digital Content an unlimited number of times...." Kindle
License Agreement, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
'' See Kindle License Agreement, supra note 28. One article noted, "The
contract also states, 'Amazon reserves the right to modify, suspend, or
discontinue the Service at any time, and Amazon will not be liable to you
should it exercise such right.' It defines 'the Service' to include 'provision of
digital content."' Thomas Claburn, INFORMATIONWEEK (July 17, 2009),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/personaltech/drm/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=218501227.
176 See Lemley, supra note 57, at 467; Usborne, supra note 91.
177 See Armstrong, supra note 42, at 61. Ironically, devices are often
hacked anyway, given enough time on the market and resources, although
these limitations can make the hack impractical for the average user. See id.
178 See Armstrong, supra note 42, at 61. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that the mere ability to enforce particular kinds of consumer
behavior through DRM implementation does not confer on providers the legal
right to such control. See Lastowka, supra note 159, at 66.
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which was initially designed to merely perform helpful data -
backups; its operational scope has since been expanded in
problematic ways to delete Kindle files.179  The amount of
information handled or controlled by Internet-based providers is
massive and even providers who develop DRM technology in
good faith could eventually encounter business incentives or legal
mandates to collect or destroy a great deal of customer data no
matter what technological protections consumers employ.s0
Inducing corporations to voluntarily remove their capacity
to interfere could be achieved by relying on competitive
markets.18 1 Perhaps the provider who guarantees that they will
never interfere with post-sale products, and eliminates their
capacity to do so, will gain enough market share to drive
competitors out of business. 182 The competitive market might
reward the provider who is able to offer the most attractive post-
sale warranties to customers.183 If, however, the free market fails
to cooperate in this way, turning to private litigation seems the
best legal solution.'84
B. The Applicability of Private Tort Litigation
A legal remedy that expresses moral condemnation and
disincentivizes future harmful action is desirable, making tort
no See Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4.
180 See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 78; Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1065-67.
"Commerce between producers and consumers now compromises 'an
exchange of goods or services for money and information."' Barnhizer, supra
note 20, at 78 (quoting Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2402 (1996)).
However,,it makes intuitive moral sense that the "power to delete your books,
movies, and music remotely is a power no one should have. .. [Amazon] ought
to remove the technical capability to do so, making such a mass evisceration
impossible in the event that a government compels it." Complaint, supra note
6, at 2 (quoting Manjoo, supra note 14).
181 See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 34, at 1500; Labriola, supra note 170, at
5.
182 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 427-28 (9th
Cir. 1983). For example, Sony has publicly announced in the wake of the
Orwell deletions that Sony does not possess the capability to delete files from
its users' eReaders, and if that promise is important enough to the public,
market forces will increase Sony's share compared to Amazon's. See Usborne,
supra note 91.
183 See Sony Corp 464 U.S. at 42 7-28; ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 178.
184 Id.
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litigation the ideal solution since it encompasses both.' In
addition to remunerating consumers for the injuries they sustain,
the potential for punitive damages in tort actions could also
disincentivize Internet-based providers' harmful behavior.186
Emphasizing the disadvantages to customers by recognizing
digital property conversion would help reinforce the element of
moral condemnation inherent in tort actions, for, "it is through
law, legal institutions, and legal processes that customs and ideas
take on a more permanent, rigid form. . .It affects ways of
thinking. "187
In the case of the Orwell deletions, Kindle users lost not
only their ebooks, but also the use of their important personal
notes.'"8  These notes could have value far beyond that of the
ebook's value and may even be irreplaceable.189 If a customer
was taking notes to gather ideas for his own upcoming
publication, to professionally review the ebook, or to take notes of
a spiritual or intensely personal nature, punitive damages could
be the most adequate way to address the loss.19 0
In addition to the possibility of punitive damages, tort
litigation is applicable due to the intentional nature of Amazon's
conduct."' Amazon promoted the note-taking features on the
Kindle and knew customers were utilizing them.'92 Further,
when Amazon deleted ebooks, it was more than likely aware that
users' coordinated notes attached to those ebooks would be
useless.'93 Thus, punitive damages in tort would be applicable
because Amazon was substantially certain that the value and
future utility of users' notes would be effectually destroyed.194
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
17 See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 18 (quoting LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW 257 (1984)).
18 See Stone, supra note 5.
189 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 233. The fleeting nature of momentary
genius cannot always be reproduced. See id.
190 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979);, ZITTRAIN, supra
note 16, at 233.
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1965).
192 See Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4.
193 See Stone, supra note 5; Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4.
194 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1965); see also Comcast
of Ill. X v. Multi-Vision Elec., Inc., 491 F.3d 938, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2007)
(discussing whether appellants knew it was substantially certain they would
intercept cable service); In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. 1, 13 n.16
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[k]nowledge to a substantial certainty constitutes intent in
the eyes of the law.. ."); McMillin v. Mueller, 695 N.W.2d 217, 226 (S.D. 2005)
(adopting substantial certainty test). Acting with substantial certainty that
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Framing the deletion as an intentional tort thus opens the door to
punitive damages.19 s
Finally, a tort remedy is applicable because most defenses
available to Amazon would likely be futile. Customer assent
through the Kindle EULA, or waiver of liability, would be no
defense to conversion, since the agreement did not mention or
even reference this specific harm.'9 6 Since many customers are
unaware that their notes could be removed at any time,
Amazon's promotion of the feature could almost approach the
realm of fraud, and certainly does not constitute express waiver
of liability.' Further, even if the Kindle EULA were construed
to somehow specifically cover deletion of user notes, the fact that
the average Kindle customer does not truly consent to the
agreement deflates the waiver of liability defense.'0 8  Where
consumer consent is based on a fundamental misunderstanding,
true assent to the EULA and waiver of the terms within it is
absent."' Release from liability for intentional harms therefore
would not extend to such provider actions.2 00
users' notes might be destroyed is paramount to acting with the intent to
destroy those notes. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1965).
195 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A (1965); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). While it may be up for debate whether
Amazon currently owes a duty to its customers not to interfere with products
post-sale, courts create legal duties, a required element of tort liability, all the
time in order to make society better off. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra
note 111, at 358; Leon Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L.
REV. 42, 45 (1962) (explaining that duties are not sacrosanct but are attempts
to invigorate beneficial social policies).
196 See Kindle License Agreement, supra note 28. Consent is generally a
full defense to conversion or tort claims. See 18 AM. JUR. Conversion § 104,
(2010) (Westlaw).
"' See 1A C.J.S. Actions § 160 (2009) (Westlaw); Claburn, supra note 175;
Manjoo, supra note 14; Amazon Kindle Homepage, supra note 4; Kindle
License Agreement, supra note 28.
19 See Lemley, supra note 57, at 467; Kindle License Agreement, supra
note 28.
19 Sep 1A C.J.S. § 160, supra note 199; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 178(2)(a) cmt. e (1981).
200 See In re Worldcom, 2010 WL 334980, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding
that Plaintiff assented to defendant's action and Plaintiff's claim fails); City of
Dillingham v. CH2M Hill Northwest, 873 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Alaska 1994)
("release of liability for negligence does not encompass a release of liability for
intentional wrongdoing" (emphasis in original)); 1A CJS § 160, supra note 199;
17A AM.JUR. 2d Contracts § 286 (2010).
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C. Conversion's Increasing Favor and Applicability
As a more specific cause of action, conversion could be a
convenient remedy since it has already been recognized by a
number of courts.201 Despite these inroads, this cause of action
will not truly help diminish the power of Internet-based providers
unless more courts begin approaching digital property as a
chattel. 202 Recently, courts have upheld trespass to chattel claims
involving digital property, recognizing computer hard drives,
electronic databases, server capacity, e-mail systems, and
computer networks as chattels. 203 All of these are arguably less
tangible than ebooks, which are analogous in their physical
display to print books. 204
Some courts have already taken important steps
recognizing virtual or digital property as appropriate for
conversion actions. 205 The arguments in Kremen and Thyroff
were greeted enthusiastically by commentators as powerful
precedent for courts to acknowledge the modern reality of virtual
property, as well as the flexible nature of the common law to
adapt.206
Being issues of state law, however, these decisions
represent persuasive, rather than binding, precedent in other
jurisdictions. 207  Additionally, many of these decisions, such as
Thyroff, offer analysis restricted to the distinct fact patterns they
addressed.2 08 Such jurisprudence does not leave much room for
analogy to new or different types of existing digital property. This
could stymie other courts' adoption of the reasoning from these
201 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 2007).
202 See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036; Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1273.
203 See, e.g., Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., 2001 WL
1736382, at *13 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (recognizing claim of trespass for digital
software); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (upholding trespass claim for search robots); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding defendant's
electronic signals trespassed on Plaintiff's computer system); Am. Online, Inc.
v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that bulk-email is
subject to trespass suits).
2G4 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
205 See Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1277-78.
206 David P. Miranda, Doctrine of Conversion Applies to Electronic
Property, Computers and the Law, N.Y. STATE BARJ. 47-48 (2008).
207 See Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1278.
20' See id; Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: the
Irrelevance of Intangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 143 (2007).
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important decisions and inhibit the growth of judicial recognition
of conversion of digital property.2 09
Even courts that are resisting this expanding conception of
conversion, like the District Court of Massachusetts, nonetheless
seem to recognize the validity of Kremen and Thyroff.21 0 The
District Court of Massachusetts itself ruled along similar lines as
Thyroff in prior cases.21 ' But by choosing instead to defer to
traditional understandings of property in In re TJX, perhaps the
court is ignoring the presence of modern technology and how
technological progress can be a legitimate factor in legal
change. 212
1. Digital Property as a Chattel for Conversion?
The digitized client lists and website domain name of
Thyroff and Kremen that were upheld as convertible chattels
intuitively seem less tangible than an ebook.213 If one conceives of
a chattel as any type of object or asset that an individual expects
to use personally and possess, then digital media like ebooks fit
the idea well.214 Simply because humans need a machine to be
able to see their purchased assets does not mean that those assets
are any less real or the user is harmed any less when their assets
are converted.215
Since the copy cost to quality ratio is quite different for
digital property versus that of the visible world, some might
argue that digital property is inherently different than tangible
chattels. 2 16 Technological ease of replication, though, is no reason
to suggest that digital objects are any less subject to ownership or
209 See Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 12 77-78; Moringiello, supra note 208, at 143.
n0 See In re TJX, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13.
211 See id.
212 See id; BANNER, supra note 160, at 247-50.
213 See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036; Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1273.
214 See Franks, supra note 107, at 505.
21 See Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (3d Cir. 1983).
Copyright law does not require people to be able to read copyrighted material
with the naked eye, and avers the legitimacy of protecting even unseen, yet
present material. See id.
216 See I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital,
and Analog Works and Their Comparison For Copyright Purposes, 26 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 211, 236-37 (2001). That the click of a button can reproduce
perfect copies of digital files indicates, perhaps that such a digital good is
inherently different from a physical object like a book, which must be copied
by hand or photocopier page by page with a final product quite distinguishable
from the original. See id.
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that their deletion is any less of an interference with the
possessor's property. 217 Furthermore, differences between digital
and tangible goods may not even be material, given the rapid
pace of technological change.2 18
Technology, arguably, has merely transformed a book's
tangibility from paper and ink to magnetic charges. 21 9 Thus, the
particles that comprise an ebook or user note constitute more
than an idea or theoretical concept and are convertible.2 20
Further, scholars argue that intangible forms of property should
nonetheless be treated as full personal property.2 2 ' While "[a]ll
privately created value does not merit the label of property," 2 22
user-created files that contain valuable information, like notes
attached to ebooks, should be considered chattels for the purposes
of conversion, even if valuable only to the creator.2  Indeed, no
harm would accrue if these notes were not particularly valuable
to the users who created them. 2 24
One element working against this classification of digital
property is that the Kindle copies of 1984 and Animal Farm were
only licensed to users, rather than sold with full title.22 5 However,
in the sense that digital property ownership could be partly
defined as the ability to exclude others, ebooks like those bought
at the Kindle store, even though only licensed, nevertheless fit the
definition.22 6 For example, the basic elements of the traditional
"bundle of [property] rights" seem present in the digital property
217 See id.
218 See id. As technology progresses, old tangible chattels are quickly
digitized, and digitized chattels are upgraded in sophistication until they
appear and behave almost exactly like tangible chattels again. See id.
"' See Michael Seringhaus, Note, E-book Transactions: Amazon "Kindles"
the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 147, 154-55 (Fall 2009)
(arguing that ebook licenses are actually protectable property); see also Warren
E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for Understanding Electronic
Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 277, 321-23 (2005).
220 See Seringhaus, supra note 219, at 154.
221 See Arias, supra note 11, at 1302-03; Hardy, supra note 216, at 221-22.
222 See Lastowka, supra note 159, at 54.
223 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 233; Hardy, supra note 216, at 222.
224 See Buckman, supra note 102, at § 2.
225 See Kindle License Agreement, supra note 28. Of course this problem
does not apply to the user-generated work products like margin notes, since the
individual user-creators indisputably hold the rights to their own creations and
the EULA makes no mention of user note ownership. See id.
226 See Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information: Conversion and
Misappropriation Causes of Action in Intellectual Property Cases, 32 Hous. L.
REV. 459, 473 (1995).
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license granted by Amazon. 2 7 Although the right to possess an
ebook is weak, users' rights to access their goods are firmly
established: the right to use is granted permanently, the right to
exclude others is practically mandated by Amazon's DRM, and
the right to dispose of the property is granted in that users may
delete the files from their devices freely. 228
Moreover, while a buyer owns the title to his print copy of
1984 but only has a license to read a remote file of 1984 on his
Kindle, the average customer is likely unaware of this
difference.22 9 Consumers' lack of information about their ebooks,
and inaccurate media portrayals have established the popular
presumption that ebooks are fully-owned chattels.230
This popular presumption is important in considering
legal solutions since public opinion influences legislative action.23 1
Further, popular conceptions of what it means to buy an ebook
may be powerful in breaking down the barriers many judges
have erected by refusing to acknowledge conversion of digital
property. The pervasive social understanding that books are
"owned" upon purchase could potentially influence judges' own
perceptions of digital property or provide further reason to follow
the precedents of New York and California.2 32
Philosophically, there is only a small step between
recognizing tangible property, like physical documents, as
chattels and recognizing intangible digital property, like ebooks,
as chattels.23 3 Unlike the computer programs that courts began
scrutinizing decades ago, sophisticated digital property today has
evolved to behave almost like tangible property when used with
associated devices.2 34 Whereas computer programs, if they were
227 See Franks, supra note 107, at 505.
2 See id.; Kindle License Agreement, supra note 28.
229 See Manjoo, supra note 14. Furthermore, one might argue that
Amazon's designation of the property as a license does not necessarily mean
that it is not more similar to an outright sale. See Seringhaus, supra note 219,
at 154; Matt Buchanan, Amazon Kindle and Sony Reader Locked Up: Why
Your Books Are No Longer Yours, GIZMODO (Mar. 21, 2008),
http://gizmodo.com/369235/.
230 See id., Claburn, supra note 175.
231 See Barnhizer, supra note 16, 18-19. It is interesting to note how
judicial adoption of particular viewpoints can help reinforce theories and ideas
in society. Whether judicial adoption is the cause or effect of social ideas is
another question entirely. See id.
" See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036; In re TJX, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13;
Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1273.
233 See Buckman, supra note 102, at § 2.
234 See Apple, 714 F.2d at 1253-54. Whereas some digitized information
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visible at all to the average Internet consumer, would look like
strings of numeric characters, digital media like ebooks appear
almost in the same form as a regular book when activated on a
mobile device.2 35 The primary difference between reading 1984 in
a print copy as opposed to on an eReader is that the process of
delivering the words to the reader's eyes is different, and happens
to be digital.236
2. Application of Court Reasoning to Ebooks
Having established that provider-created and user-created
digital property fits within a workable concept of chattels, it is
clear that recovery for the intentional deletion of such property
may be possible through a conversion action.237 Amazon
interfered with its customers' rights to control their ebooks and
notes.238 This interference was intentional, given that they
offered a rationale and presumptive justification for the
removal.239 It also completely deprived Kindle customers of their
purchases, constituting dispossession without advance notice and
precluded them from accessing their own content.240 Those notes
might as well have been deleted, since their utility was contingent
on continued reference and access to the source ebook.241
like computer code is quite shareable, meaning copies may be made and
distributed by end-users without diluting their own use, ebooks are loaded
with so much DRM that only sophisticated hackers could copy the book text.
See Buchanan, supra note 229. Consequently, the average user could only
share his Kindle copy of 1984 with a neighbor by physically lending the Kindle
device. See id. In this way, ebooks actually function like a tangible chattel
much more than other types of digital property. See Apple, 714 F.2d at 1253-
54; Hardy, supra note 216, at 215.
2.5 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1048, 1066.
236 See id.
237 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 223 (1965).
238 See id.; Manjoo, supra note 14.
239 See RESTATEMENT (Second) of Torts §§ 222A, 224 (1965).
240 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 221, 223, 224 (1965); see
also Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 818 A.2d 1159, 1172
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (holding that defendant-car dealership wrongfully
converted Plaintiff's laptop, CD collection, and $2500 in cash left in trunk of
car, when defendant properly repossessed plaintiff's car upon noncompliance
with financing agreement but refused to return personal property).
241 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A, 224 (1965). It would
be hard to make the argument that user-generated notes were actually taken
from users' possession because the note files were not formally deleted. See
Fowler, supra note 2. Rather, their value was lost, as the notes no longer
referred to anything once the base text was removed. See Complaint, supra
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Utilizing the factors set out by the courts that recognize
digital property for conversion, Kindle ebooks and user work
products appear to meet the requirements for conversion suits. 24 2
Following the relevant Thyroff elements, conversion is a fitting
remedy to recoup the expense of a deleted digital book purchase,
as well as to recover for deleted writing.2 43 Moreover, although
the digital chattels involved could not be printed at the push of a
button, they did exist on a physical display designed to look and
act like a physical book.24 4
Further, according to Kremen's three-prong test, the
property affected by the Orwell deletions was well-defined
enough to objectively display its inherent capacity to be owned.2 45
The digital books and notes were also exclusive, harming users
when the property was converted.2 46 The owners certainly had
legitimate claims of exclusive ownership, backed by the Kindle
EULA language itself.247
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Promoting Conversion
Advantages and disadvantages to consumers may arise
with the judicial recognition of converted digital property.2 48
Recognition would advantageously distinguish conversion
liability from the tort of trespass to chattels. 249 Digital trespass
discussions in recent years have generally involved issues like
spy-bots, unwanted spain, and cookies.2 5 0 Addressing power
note 6, at 4; Fowler, supra note 2. The utility of a note referencing a notation
on another page, for example, would be close to nothing. See Complaint, supra
note 6, at 4; Fowler, supra note 2.
242 See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030; Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1277; Laura D.
Mruk, Note, Wi-Fi Signals Capable of Conversion: The Case for
Comprehensive Conversion in Illinois, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 356-57
(2008).
243 See Thyroff , 864 N.E.2d at 1277.
244 See id.
245 See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
246 See id.; Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
247 See Complaint, supra note 6, at 4; Kindle License Agreement, supra
note 28.
248 See Franks, supra note 107, at 505.
249 See United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1097-98 (D. Md. 1994)
(distinguishing trespass to chattels from conversion); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
2so See Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity:
An Application to Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (addressing
cyberspace torts); Daniel Kearney, Network Effects and the Emerging
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imbalances through conversion provides clear theoretical
separation from today's trespass-oriented digital property
scholarship debates, and lets conversion address the most
egregious conduct of digital property providers.2 51 Conversion is
more congruent with the serious nature of the permanent deletion
of digital property than trespass because conversion is a more
serious tort, leading to social disapproval and greater monetary
compensation when liability is assigned. 25 2
On the other hand, remedial conversion theories could
disadvantage customers who do not actually hold a license to a
given product.25 3 Assuming, for the sake of illustration, that
Amazon was not able to grant a true ebook license because its
own authorization to distribute them was faulty, then users
would be left with no real digital property right in the ebook.254
Therefore, customers would have difficulty litigating their rights
through conversion actions. Indeed, their only chance to regain
some of their lost value would be through conversion suits related
to their own user notes; suits of this nature may be cost
prohibitive to many customers whose notes are not objectively
valuable. 255  Approaching digital property as a chattel, though,
could allow bona fide purchasers to estop infringement of their
post-sale digital property rights.256
Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 313 (2005) (addressing
spain as capable of cybertrespass); Michael R. Siebecker, Cookies and the
Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing on Our Computers, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 893 (2003) (discussing question of whether Internet-based cookies
can constitute trespass claims).
251 See Arora, 860 F. Supp. at 1097; Complaint, supra note 6, at 13-14.
Section 222 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts points out that while
dispossessing another of his chattel is grounds for trespass liability, a
dispossession that seriously interferes with the right of the owner to control the
chattel shifts liability to conversion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 222 (1965). Section 218(b) notes that in trespass, "the chattel is impaired as to
its condition, quality, or value.. ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
218(b) (1965). Mere impairment or diminution in value is not the same as
serious interference, like complete deletion. See id.
2s2 See Arora, 860 F. Supp. at 1097-98. 
-
253 See Buckman, supra note 102, at §2. The possession of a property right
is essential to establish conversion. Id.
254 See Buchanan, supra note 229.
255 See Complaint, supra note 6, at 8; ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 233.
256 See Estoppel of Chattel Owner After Sale by Unauthorized Vendor, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1953). See also Blount v. Bainbridge, 53 S.E.2d
122, 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (upholding sale and delivery of car since
purchaser was bona fide); Hawkins v. M & J Fin. Corp., 77 S.E.2d 669, 673
(N.C. 1953) (holding indicia of ownership insufficient to give notice of prior
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In addition, some might argue that encouraging judicial
recognition of digital property in conversion of chattels actions
could invite a flood of litigation into an already congested court
system. However, such a flood would benefit consumers in two
ways. 257 First, the sheer volume of lawsuits could send a wake-up
call to Internet-based digital product providers, prompting
voluntary restraint of post-sale controls.25 8 Second, increased
litigation activity could bring the control imbalance between
providers and customers to the public's attention, concomitantly
helping to solve the information imbalance by educating
customers and readjusting expectations about digital property. 25 9
V. Conclusion
Digital property owners and users of online services
received a warning notice when Amazon unilaterally deleted
ebooks and personal notes from users' Kindles. 260 This action
was a tell-tale sign of the relationship between Internet-based
providers and consumers in the computer era where transactions
occur online, digital property is bought and sold there, and
providers retain an unfettered amount of control.26 1 Such power
imbalances will continually increase if technologically-advanced
providers are incentivized to exert power over their customers.2 62
Judicial acceptance of digital chattels for conversion
actions would likely provide meaningful results for consumers
where other approaches have failed.26 3 Tort-based liability will
also effectively incentivize providers to change their behavior and
punish those who do not with potential punitive damages.264
Courts in New York and California have taken the lead
by recognizing various forms of digital property as convertible.
Thus, other courts need not take great leaps of reasoning to
establish new precedent.26 5 Technological developments can
ownership); McKinney v. Croan, 188 S.W.2d 144, 146-47 (Tex. 1945) (holding
car sale invalid and estoppel not available).
257 See Buchanan, supra note 229; Manjoo, supra note 14.
258 See Buchanan, supra note 229.
259 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 177; Buchanan, supra note 229;
Manjoo, supra note 14.
260 See Stone, supra note 5; Usborne, supra note 91.
261 See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 2; Usborne, supra note 91.
262 See infra note 93-106 and accompanying text.
263 See infra notes 107-259 and accompanying text.
264 See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
265 See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030, 1036; Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1273, 1277-
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change the assumptions people have about the world, facilitating
and encouraging legal change.2 66 The tests and standards created
in cases like Kremen and Thyroff fit digital property well. Their
application in other jurisdictions could permit the widespread
protection of digital property rights through conversion.267
Receiving full-fledged judicial support could be just the kick-
start digital property needs to finally empower Internet
consumers and propel conversion law into the computer age. 268
78.
266 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1066.
267 See infra notes 126-151, 169-259 and accompanying text.
268 See infra notes 107-259 and accompanying text.
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